Abstract of INFO-MAC archived Text file
   'comm/inet/mail/edr/eudora-pwserve-3.shar'
  Uploaded 09/29/1993   19517 bytes

#!/bin/sh
# This is a shell archive (shar 3.32)
# made 02/11/1993 21:23 UTC by dorner@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu
# Source directory /cso/staff/dorner
#
# existing files WILL be overwritten
#
# This shar contains:
# length  mode       name
# ------ ---------- ------------------------------------------
#  15723 -rw-r--r-- poppassd.c
#   2030 -rw-r--r-- Makefile
#
if touch 2>&1 | fgrep 'amc' > /dev/null
 then TOUCH=touch
 else TOUCH=true
fi
# ============= poppassd.c ==============
echo "x - extracting poppassd.c (Text)"
sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > poppassd.c &&
X/*
X * poppassd.c
X * 
X * Daemon to service Eudora "Change Password" requests.  This program
X * doesn't actually change any passwords itself.  It simply listens for
X * incomming requests, gathers the required information (user name, old
X * password, new password) and executes /bin/passwd, talking to it over
X * a pseudo-terminal pair.  The advantage of this is that we don't need
X * to have any knowledge of either the password file format (which may
X * include dbx files that need to be rebuilt) or of any file locking
X * protocol /bin/passwd and cohorts may use (and which isn't documented).
X *
X * Note that unencrypted passwords are transmitted over the network.  If
X * this bothers you, think hard about whether you want to implement Eudora's
X * password changing feature.  On the other hand, it's no worse than what
X * happens when you run /bin/passwd while connected via telnet or rlogin.
X * Well, maybe it is, since the use of a dedicated port makes it slightly
X * easier for a network snooper to snarf passwords off the wire.
X *
X * NOTE: In addition to the security issue outlined in the above paragraph,
X * you should be aware that this program is going to be run as root by
X * ordinary users and it mucks around with the password file.  This should
X * set alarms off in your head.  I think I've devised a pretty foolproof
X * way to ensure that security is maintained, but I'm no security expert and
X * you would be a fool to install this without first reading the code and
X * ensuring yourself that what I consider safe is good enough for you.  If
X * something goes wrong, it's your fault, not mine.
X *
X * This is an adaptation of a server by the same name from dll@mitre.org
X * (Daniel L. Leavitt of The MITRE Corporation).  The front-end code (which
X * talks to the Eudora client) is directly descended from his original